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THE VARIED POLICIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
JURIDICAL BODIES-REFLECTIONS ON 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
John H. Jackson* 
I would like to begin with two particular vignettes set in the context 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide a landscape of some 
of the difficulties faced by that organization, and which apply to the 
broader theme of international norms, the subject of this symposium. 
The first illustration is the Appellate Body Membership and the 
process for choosing the Appellate Body Members who sit on each case. 
A seven member roster is chosen by various diplomatic means, creating 
a diverse group. Members come from different legal cultures, bring dif-
ferent legal premises, and represent various legal systems. This diversity 
is evidenced in the rather massive amount of WTO dispute settlement 
jurisprudence that has already been developed-over 25,000 pages in 
approximately eighty different cases have been adopted by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body reports-all in the short span of nine years. I In 
one of those cases, the Shrimp-Turtle case,2 which I view as perhaps the 
most interesting constitutional case, one could see some of these diverse 
ideas emerging. One of the issues was the degree to which the Appellate 
Body, as an institution of the WTO, could look to text or policy designa-
tions outside the framework of its regime.3 In the Shrimp-Turtle case, 
the Division of three Members suggested that to interpret a particular 
provision of GATT Article XX chapeau, they could look to a variety of 
documents and measures that lay outside the framework or borders of 
that treaty. In the process, they said, they were forced to acknowledge 
some conflicting policies, and therefore, to perform some balancing 
among them. 
* University Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (GULC), Wash-
ington, D.C.; Director, Institute of International Economic Law, GULC; Hessel E. Yntema 
Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
I. Since January I, 1995, the WTO dispute settlement system has received 309 com-
plaints, see World Trade Organization Secretariat, Update ofWTO Dispute Settlement Cases, 
WTO Doc. WTIDS/OV/20 (Mar. 26,2004), and has completed 77 with adopted reports. The 
total number of pages of the jurisprudence exceeds twenty-five thousand, and all informed 
observers seem to recognize that this is indeed a remarkable achievement, particularly when 
one examines the intricacy and complexity of the cases, and the importance of the analysis and 
reasoning. See, e.g., Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2002: A 
Statistical Analysis, 6 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 251 (2003). 
2. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WTIDS58/ABIR (Oct. 12, 1998). 
3. It has been made very clear by the Appellate Body, from its very first case, that it is 
not an insulated or separate regime, but is part of the international law system. 
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That particular aspect of the opinion raised some heavy criticism. 
Some diplomats argued that it is not for the juridical system of the WTO 
to do the balancing, but that it must be left to the diplomats to do that in 
their negotiations and norm-creating, and they argued that the Appellate 
Body was over-extending, or going beyond its mandate. Others, of 
course, disagreed with that argument, including this author. I happen to 
be an admirer of that particular case, and part of what I admire is the 
articulation of the ability of the Appellate Body to draw on other 
sources. 
A second vignette that is related to other contributions within this 
volume is the difficulty of a particular piece of text of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements in the WTO context. This has to do with the arcane 
business related to antidumping law, which generally, in some respects, 
is the scandal of international trade, but nevertheless it is here to stay.4 I 
refer here, however, specifically to a particular standard of review clause 
embedded in the Antidumping Agreement.5 The U.S. negotiators in-
tended the standard to apply across the board, to all dispute settlement 
systems, but they were not able achieve that, so it is embedded only in 
the Antidumping Agreement, Article 17.6, and in particular, the second 
paragraph of 17.6. The question is: what kind of deference should the 
dispute settlement system of the WTO give to a nation-state decision as 
to how it will interpret the treaty language that applies in antidumping 
cases? The U.S. negotiators wanted to push the Chevron case into the 
dispute settlement system, but they failed, and what finally emerged in 
the middle of the night, written "on the back of an envelope" were two 
sentences of slightly convoluted language. One sentence stated that the 
interpretation shall be made according to the normal "customary rules of 
public international law." Everyone who was in the room when that lan-
guage was delivered, as far as I could sample, believed that essentially is 
the explanation given in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), although the VCLT itself, of course, does not apply in this in-
stance, partly because there are many member states of the WTO who 
have not ratified it. The second sentence said that if there is more than 
one permissible interpretation, the dispute settlement system of the WTO 
should defer to the nation-state that accepted one of the permissible in-
terpretations. 
4. See, e.g., BRINK LINDSEY & DAN IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE DEVILISH 
DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW (2003). 
5. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, Apr. IS, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex lA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226, availllble at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/tlURlFNI 9-adp.wpf [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
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Therein lies the division· of opinion, incidentally almost a trans-
Atlantic division. In Europe, many evaluators (scholars and others) have 
said that if one follows the first sentence in 17.6, there always is only 
one permissible interpretation. Therefore, the analysis is over and. the 
second sentence has no meaning whatsoever. On the U.S. side of the At-
lantic, the opposite view is prevalent: that, in fact, there is plenty of 
evidence of situations in which one could argue that there exist more 
than one permissible interpretation. There are domestic courts issuing 
five-to-four rulings, and one could also say that the lower courts going 
one way and the upper court coming another way suggests that, at the 
very least, rational minds could differ on this, and therefore, there might 
be more than one "permissible" interpretation. It has really been a quite 
remarkable and interesting tug-of-war, one that has embedded itself in 
some of the decisions that have gone forward in the WTO dispute set-
tlement system. 
Hopefully those illustrations have provided some context as to how 
the WTO dispute settlement system fits into the topic of this volume, and 
I would now like to turn to how my current thinking and writing relate to 
the broader issues of international law norm creation. One such article is 
quite recent and it represents some of my thinking in these broader gen-
eral issues. It is entitled Sovereignty Modern,6 and it is a close look at the 
question of sovereignty and how it affects the fundamental logic of in-
ternational law. I do not pretend that I have finalized my views, but 
fundamentally very few people really accept the original, Westphalian 
idea of sovereignty anymore. There are many other constructs of what 
sovereignty currently means, and what its significance should be going 
forward, but there is a real confusion about the notion generally. It is an 
important notion to explore, however, as the fundamentals of interna-
tional law arguably depend, at least somewhat, on the concept. For 
example, if the concept of sovereignty is that the sovereign is the highest 
authority, and that there is no higher authority as to anyone sovereign, 
the resulting concept leads to something like equality of nations. It also 
suggests noninterference of any kind, whether economic or military or 
other, and that principle is very hard to maintain. 
But perhaps most significant is that this concept of sovereignty 
seems to be the core of the "consent theory" of international law. In 
other words, the theory that an international law norm cannot be formed 
unless there is consent by the nation-state parties. Although there has 
been an edging away from that theory, particularly in the era of weapons 
of mass destruction, rogue states or failed states, human rights, and so 
6. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty Modem: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782-802 (2003). 
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on, this concept is certainly being challenged. For example, a study con-
ducted by the Canada-based International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty came out with the notion of the "responsibility to 
protect.,,7 The key questions raised by the concept of consent are: what 
does consent mean and how much of it is necessary? 
These questions lead to a corollary idea: as we get into these differ-
ent kinds of regimes (if you want to call them that), it appears, and I 
think it is partly demonstrated by the contents of this volume, that more 
and more often, a juridical type institution is critically central to the re-
gimes. This is certainly true in the WTO, in the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, the International Criminal Court, and in a variety of other 
contexts. That necessity leads, of course, to worries about fragmentation. 
I tend to agree with some of this volume's other contributors' views that 
there is a value to fragmentation, and there is a related discourse or dia-
logue in which we need to engage. 
Stemming from a realization of the necessity for and tendency to-
ward juridical institutions, I began thinking about the goals of such an 
institution. My primary context was that of the WTO, but I was inevita-
bly led beyond those borders. Just exactly why do we want a juridical 
institution? In the WTO, several goals are articulated, particularly in the 
so-called Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).8 A primary goal 
mentioned is stability and predictability of the rules. In the area of inter-
national trade (as in other international arenas), the activities of 
individuals or business entities have international implications just as 
those of nation-states do. These individuals or entities have a functional 
need for a certain amount of predictability and stability. Economists call 
it "reducing the risk premium." One could say that suggests certain kinds 
of goals for the WTO dispute settlement system-to try and clarify is-
sues in a way that is predictable and stable over time. That suggests, for 
instance, that stability over time leads to some kind of a precedent effect, 
not stare decisis, but perhaps a more flexible kind of consistency. On the 
other hand, there are some other articulated values in the DSU itself that 
may conflict with ideas of predictability and stability. One such poten-
tially conflicting value is to have quick, efficient settlement of disputes. 
Thus, one begins to consider other goals of juridical systems. One is 
to redress harm. That is not a goal of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. The WTO does not generally embrace the concept of "paying 
off' for a past harm. Any compensation is forward-looking. 
7. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
[ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT II (2001), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. 
8. WTO Agreement, supra note 5, at Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. IS, 1994, art. 3, para. 2. 
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Another policy question that underlies a juridical system's goals is 
the method in which the system addresses gaps and ambiguities. To what 
degree should the juridical institution have the power to fill in a gap? 
The difficulty emerging is that when such myriad goals coexist, for 
example within the same dispute settlement system, it is possible to fol-
low the policy goals to different ends, thus the same dispute settlement 
system is forced to perform a balancing act. Additionally, there exist dif-
ferent dispute settlement systems, and there could be other systems that 
have a perfectly rational jurisprudence that seems consistent and integral, 
but which would be different from the system of a given regime because 
the goals are different. Thus, these goals must be analyzed not only in 
the context of dispute settlement, but also within the broader framework 
of the goals of the participant governments. 
This begs the question then, what are the participant governments' 
goals? When they sign on to a complex treaty system that has a dispute 
settlement system, what precisely are they signing on to? In this regard, I 
will explore just a couple of the dozens of deep jurisprudential issues 
implicated by this question. For instance, what kinds of elements can go 
into the interpretation of a treaty? One flamboyantly difficult and con-
troversial question is: can one adopt an "evolutionary" approach to the 
interpretation of a treaty? In other words, could a treaty body's interpre-
tation as to a simple clause such as "like product" differ over time? 
Furthermore, the institutional structure of the system is important to con-
sider. If a bilateral treaty, perhaps the VCLT, can resolve the issue, the 
parties can get together and modify their treaty. But a massive, multilat-
eral treaty like the WTO, with 148 participants and consisting of 26,000 
pages, cannot easily be modified. Indeed, some people believe that it 
cannot be changed at all and the result is what we call "treaty rigidity." 
The concept of treaty rigidity may conflict with certain of the institu-
tion's goals, such as that of trying to enhance world welfare through a 
series of policies, some of which have to be balanced against other poli-
cies. This suggests that maybe the system must somehow keep up with 
what is going on in the world, and therefore, an interpretation may have 
to be evolutionary. 
One final point is a related concept which seems to me to be an ex-
treme and limit pushing idea of state consent to international law norms. 
This concept particularly comes up in the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem. The concept has a beautiful latin phrase that many do not fully 
understand-in dubio mitius.9 It essentially spells out the idea that if 
there is any doubt about an interpretation at all, the government that has 
9. Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
("Honnones"), WTO Doc. WTIDS26/ABIR, at 67 n.154 (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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signed on to it and is now the actor taking a certain interpretation has not 
consented to anything else. In other words, if there is a gap or ambiguity, 
the actor has not consented to any determination that might be made by 
the dispute settlement system. Therefore, there would always be a tilt in 
favor of the nation-state. I would suggest that this idea in practice would 
very quickly undermine and unravel most of the norms in complicated, 
multilateral treaties, because there is no way to negotiate those treaties 
without having a certain number of gaps and ambiguities--one cannot 
come to closure or the final ministerial meeting without leaving some 
loose ends. Still, the concept has been embraced, incidentally by certain 
specific special interest advocacy groups, particularly inside the beltway 
in Washington, D.C., and one might imagine where that is coming from 
if one watches what is going on in the U.S. Congress. 
Finally, to further illustrate my point about the existence of many 
policy objectives for international (and national) dispute settlement 
mechanisms, I append a brief "overview text" listing some objectives, 
drawn from several prior works of mine, including a lecture presented in 
May of 2003.10 
To briefly summarize, it can thus be seen that "fragmentation" can 
have several dimensions, and that the difference between juridical ap-
proaches as well as legislative approaches to treaty or other norm stating 
documents can result not only from different institutional settings, but 
also from different policy goals assumed for differing dispute settlement 
systems. 
10. John H. Jackson, Lecture at the Third Annual WTO Conference: "Dispute Resolu-
tion-At the Crossroads" (London, May 14,2003). The lecture was sponsored by the British 
Institute of International & Comparative Law (London), the Institute of International Eco-
nomic Law (Washington, D.C.), and the Journal of International Economic Law. An article 
based on this lecture is shortly due for publication in a volume compiled by BIICL. 
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APPENDIX 
POLICY GOALS UNDERPINNING 
INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL 
INSTITUTIONS-A TENTATIVE LIST 
875 
1. Undo harm done by respondent, to redress complainant's 
injury. 
A common goal in domestic jurisprudence systems is to undo 
a harm, to make the harm doer pay back the harmed person in 
some way, whether it is tort damages, criminal penalties, or 
some other remedy. This goal does not seem to be part of the 
GAITIWTO system. There is some quarrel about the question 
of whether there should be reimbursement of anti-dumping 
duties or a rollback of subsidies, and some of the jurispru-
dence on this issue tends to be quite muddled, but overall, I 
judge the system to mostly deny the notion of retroactive, or 
backward-looking retribution, remedy, or compensation. 
2. Settle the differences amicably to restrict international 
tensions, avoid conflict, or even war. 
Settling differences amicably was quite an important goal at 
the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference and during the three or 
four years following it, including the attempt at creating an 
International Trade Organization (an attempt which failed), 
and during the development of the GAIT. The foremost goal 
of those discussions was to avoid another World War, and in-
deed there has been quite a bit of success in that regard. It 
must remain an important goal of any international dispute 
settlement system to help prevent or control the use of force, 
war, etc. 
3. Settle the differences efficiently ("promptly" e.g. DSU 3.3). 
Efficient breach idea can conflict with rule stability? 
If disputes drag on for a decade, the point often arrives where 
there really can be no remedy, and the system is clearly not 
operating effectively. There is an argument now that, as tight 
as the schedules are in the WTO, they should be reduced 
more, and that is going to create tension as against the quality 
of the output. 
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4. Provide jurisprudence or "precedents" for predictability and 
stability; DSU 3.2. 
The word precedent is a big question, to be addressed else-
where. The basic ideas about predictability and stability that I 
mentioned above are clearly underlying policy goals of the 
dispute settlement system which are enhanced by the appro-
priate application of precedent techniques. 
5. Fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in treaty text. 
Multilateral treaties always have ambiguities and gaps. Are 
these gaps necessary in order to get the consensus required to 
come to resolution? Many times the diplomats have to gloss 
over real differences with language that both sides differently 
interpret a text in order to reach a meeting of the minds as to 
language. Of course, when they do that, in a sense they are 
delegating power to a dispute settlement system to resolve 
conflicts of interpretation that will inevitably arise. Neverthe-
less, there may be some conflict between this and some of the 
other goals on this list. 
6. Promote compliance with dispute settlement outcome. 
In dispute settlement, compliance with the results ought to be 
promoted so that the treaty norms can be effective and de-
pended upon. In fact, the mere existence of a dispute 
settlement process has a strong component of assisting com-
pliance on the international landscape, even without sanctions 
or "retaliation." Alternatives to sanctions and retaliation in-
clude shaming techniques, reciprocity notions, etc. 
7. Redress asymmetries of power; fairness to weaker entities. 
A dispute settlement system helps redress asymmetries of 
power. Smaller or less developed countries can bring a case 
against larger, wealthier countries, and win at both the Panel 
and Appellate levels. Costa Rica, for example won a case 
against the United States at the first level and Appellate stages 
in a case about underwear. 
8. Re-establish a balance of benefits, "rebalancing." 
Re-balancing of benefits is an issue that has been central to 
some of the criticism of the WTO. Many argue that this 
should be a goal of the system. This is the reciprocity idea run 
wild, but it nevertheless has its origins in the preparatory 
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work of the GATT itself. Some argue that all that needs to be 
done is to re-balance the benefits so that the party that is the 
"wrong doer" should give a new set of concessions equivalent 
to the value of what it seems to have taken away, and that 
should be the end of the matter. In other words, observance or 
performance of the international obligation takes a lesser role. 
This obviously creates an enormous tension with some of the 
goals, particularly the goals of predictability for the non-
participants in a particular case. For this reason, the reciproc-
ity or re-balancing idea has virtually faded to non-existence 
during the last twenty-five years or so of the GATTIWTO sys-
tem, but nevertheless it is still advocated quite vociferously by 
particular interests in the United States. 
9. Give the participating parties a sense o/their "day in court;" 
right to fair procedure? 
This immediately raises the question, "who is the real party"? 
Governments, their citizens, or international businesses (mar-
ket participants)? 
The idea of a party's "day in court" is nothing new. If the par-
ties battle it out in court (it is incorrect to use the word court, 
incidentally, because the WTO system does not like to use ju-
dicial terminology) or in a creditable process with genuine 
integrity that is non-corruptible, then the parties have a sense 
of having been treated fairly, and nation states, for example, 
can return to their constituents to report on their effort with 
the knowledge that perhaps they will win the next time. 
10. Provide reasoned judgments to enhance broader public ac-
ceptance of the application and development of the rules. 
It is an important policy objective to be able to use the judg-
ment in a dispute settlement proceeding to enhance broader 
public acceptance of the results. These results may trod on 
certain constituents' toes in certain cases, particularly con-
stituents who have benefited from some exception from 
international competition and now find that they must comply, 
but it is perhaps for this reason that the goal is important. This 
process is useful to governments in that it helps them per-
suade their constituents to do the "right thing." This idea 
relates to paragraph 9 above. 
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11. Reasoned analysis of important policy implications of the rule 
application, so as to shed light on complex issues and dilem-
mas requiring a balancing approach (thus assisting other 
governmental processes). 
This goal is subtler. The Well-Reasoned Opinion can often 
alert rule makers and decision makers in the non-dispute set-
tlement part vf the system to particular intricacies of the 
procedural problems. In the Shrimp-Turtle case, for instance 
(the case I consider the most important case of the jurispru-
dence of the WTO so far), there is a deeper sense of some of 
the analysis that is necessary and really pervasive in much of 
the other jurisprudence. 
12. Define and rationalize the allocation of governmental powers, 
i.e. "repair" the constitution & provide for evolution. 
Finally, there is a sort of a "constitutional" element of the 
dispute settlement process. It will, from time to time, be 
called upon essentially to allocate power among different 
parts of the same institution or different levels of the interna-
tional landscape. That might call into question whether a 
certain kind of decision, regulatory norm, etc. is best made 
in Geneva; Washington, D.C.; Sacramento, California; 
Berkeley, California; or a neighborhood in Berkeley. A simi-
lar scale or ladder of levels of governmental activity applies 
in Europe and elsewhere in the world. 
